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In Laws of Media, written with his son Eric, Marshall McLuhan aimed to assign 
scientific status to his ideas, presenting his Tetrad model and offering several 
examples of its application. Mcluhanism places great emphasis on media 
ecology specific perceptual bias; authors such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, David Chalmers and Andy Clark allow 
us to bridge it to the research on consciousness and brain carried through the 
last decades. If media creates an experience related to its epistemic context, 
it is possible to approach the forms of human-machine coupling – especially 
in digital culture –, by examining the hypothesis of a triplex isomorphism 
between <brain><apparatus><experience> that would turn mcluhanism into 
hard science. This hypothesis’ aspects are discussed, alongside further problems 
related to contemporary artwork creation.
Na obra Leis da Mídia, escrita com seu filho Eric, Marshall McLuhan 
pretendeu atribuir um status científico às suas ideias, apresentando seu modelo 
em Tétrade e oferecendo vários exemplos de sua aplicação. O mcluhanismo 
enfatiza fortemente o viés perceptual específico da ecologia da mídia; autores 
como Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, David 
Chalmers e Andy Clark nos permitem associá-lo à pesquisa sobre consciência 
e cérebro das últimas décadas. Se a mídia cria uma experiência relacionada 
ao seu contexto epistêmico, é possível analisar formas de acoplamento 
homem-máquina – especialmente na cultura digital – ao examinar a hipótese 
de um tríplice isomorfismo entre <cérebro><aparato><experiência>, que 
transformaria o mcluhanismo em ciência dura. Aspectos desta hipótese são 
discutidos, juntamente a outros problemas relacionados à criação de obras de 
arte contemporânea.
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McLuhan and scientific validation
In Laws of Media (LoM)1, written with his son Eric and released 
posthumously (1988), Marshall McLuhan attempted to assign a 
scientific status to his ideas about media and culture, presenting his 
now famous Tetrad and offering several examples of its application to 
media and other cultural phenomena.
At the very opening of the book, this is made clear: “This essay 
offers in testable and falsifiable form (the criteria of scientific laws) 
observations about the structure and nature of things man makes and 
does; hence Laws in its title”2.
Obviously, having dedicated his life to refining a way of interpreting 
the history of culture as history of media, McLuhan aimed to leave an 
intellectual legacy established in rigorous terms. Thus, while resorting 
to Karl Popper’s criteria of falsifiability – thus subscribing the idea of 
science as a collective enterprise towards objective material truth –, 
he also expected to align his ideas with contemporary, systemic science, 
rejecting classical linear causality (which he obviously considered 
related to literacy) and foregrounding the non-linear properties of his 
theoretical model, described as a New Science. As such, LoM is, most 
of all, the result of a style of asking, a “heuristic device” based on four 
questions to be asked to any technology, artifact or idea3:
• What does it enhance or intensify?
• What does it render obsolete or displace?
• What does it retrieve that was previously obsolesced?
• What does it produce or become when pushed to an extreme?
It is debatable if the Tetrad model indeed satisfies Popper’s 
demands, since its testability can be discussed in the same terms 
Popper dismisses Freudian psychoanalysis theory: it seems to always 
work, so it is not as falsifiable as the McLuhan claim. However, just like 
Freud’s model of interpretation of the unconscious, McLuhan’s model 
has had a lasting influence, and has generated a whole field of media-
theory studies. Having embraced McLuhan’s theory long ago, I felt, in 
my own work, pressed by the same “scientific” demands, to validate my 
own thinking in different dialogue contexts.
Since one of McLuhan’s main thesis concerns media’s impact on 
human senses, it is possible, for example, to combine McLuhan’s findings 
with Merleau-Ponty’s work about perception (e.g., Basbaum4,5), but the 
question remains, doubled: Merleau-Ponty’s astonishing Phenomenology 
1. MCLUHAN, Marshall; 
MCLUHAN, Eric. Laws of 
media. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1988. p. 98-99.
2. Ibidem. p. 3.
3. MCLUHAN, Marshall, 
MCLUHAN, Eric. Op. cit. 
p. 98-99.
4. BASBAUM, Sérgio. O 
primado da percepção de 
suas consequências no 
ambiente midiático. São 
Paulo: Intermeios: Fapesp, 
2016.
5. Idem. McLuhan and 
continental philosophy: 
how merleau-ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception 
helps support and continue 
McLuhan’s directions. In: 
CIASTELLARDI, Matteo; 
ALMEIDA, Cristina; SCOLARI, 
Carlos (ed.). McLuhan galaxy: 
understanding media today. 
Barcelona: Universidad Oberta 
de Catalunya, 2011. p. 552-561.
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of Perception6 was also released many decades ago (the original French 
edition was released in 1945), and since then a lot of water has passed 
under the bridge in the fields of the Philosophy of Mind and, specially, 
Neuroscience, which have experienced an enormous expansion 
in the last  decades, surfing on the unfulfilled promise of offering a 
naturalistic account of mind, in hard-science terms: “No longer need 
one spend time attempting… to endure the tedium of philosophers 
perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is now largely a 
scientific problem” 7.
What follows reflects this aim to incorporate some kind of hard-
science counterpart to ideas I have been working with in the last years, 
about technology and the senses, through a dialogue with contemporary 
cognitive neuroscience. Some interesting hypotheses emerge, which 
can also be questioned on different levels. At the core of these ideas 
lays the hypothesis of a triplex isomorfism between [<brain><apparatus
es><experience> (individual and collective)].
It is also useful to remind the reader that any discussion about 
senses and perception will, in one way or another, have consequences on 
our understanding of aesthetics; thus, a final section will be dedicated 
to considering some aspects of aesthetic experience and our encounters 
with works of art. 
Experience
To be a consciousness, or rather to be an experience, 
is to have an inner communication with the world, the body, 
and others, to be with them rather than beside them.8
Therefore, if philosophy is in harmony with the cinema, if thought and techni-
cal effort are heading in the same direction, it is because the philosopher 
and the moviemaker share a certain way of being, a certain view of the world 
which belongs to a generation.9
Cinema spectatorship as media experience
In LoM, McLuhan applies his tetrad to several ideas and 
apparatuses in Modern culture, sketching an innovative strategy to 
interpret their impact on human culture. Although LoM does not 
6.  MERLEAU-PONTY, 
Maurice. Phenomenology 
of perception. New York: 
Routledge, 2013 
7. CRICK, Francis, 1996 apud 
NOE, Alva; THOMPSON, Evan. 
Are there neural correlates 
of consciousness? Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 
Exeter, v. 11, n. 1, p. 3-28, 
2004. p. 3.
8. MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. 
Op. cit. p. 99.
9. MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: 
Sense and non-sense. 
Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964. p. 59.
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explore it, cinema is an excellent case to understand the relation 
between media technology and experience (individual and collective). 
The overheating of literacy in the 19th century flips into several media 
novelties, like photograph, telegraph, gramophone, telephone and 
movies. The impact of cinema on mass culture is enormous: Brazilian 
influential film director Glauber Rocha10 has even named the twentieth 
century the “Century of Cinema”. Such impact is not fortuitous: as a 
media technology – specially in its dominant narrative form –, cinema 
is a synthesis of all key values of Modernity: visuality, narrative, 
mechanicism, technical reproduction, appropriation of reality through 
the assemblage of small pieces – such reality taken as an objective 
material visual appearance –, an industrially produced commodity, a 
collective (mass) ritual: cinema is the book for the masses. In Vilém 
Flusser’s quasi-mcluhanic account of Western culture, it is the 
imagination of nineteenth century texts: technical images have created 
a new imagination, able to unify a culture fragmented by literacy and 
classical science11. Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, 
it seems that the rich, the poor, intellectuals, ordinary people, artists, 
philosophers, priests and scientists… everybody had one common 
passion: Charlie Chaplin. 
All this said, in terms of what it sets in motion, the movie theater’s 
spectator lives an experience that is directly related to the epistemological 
context from which “cinema” emerges: the classical film spectator 
experiences the condition of the classical subject. Its hegemony in mass 
culture transfers to the spectator the illusion of being a protagonist in 
the on-going cultural process of making-sense of the objective world, the 
illusion of playing a relevant part in the epistemological regime of 
the modern subject. Such is the experience of cinema spectatorship. 
From this, one can infer that the experience set in motion by a certain 
media apparatus is directly related to the epistemological context from 
which it emerges.
Neural correlates of consciousness
In the last decades, as a direct effect of the invention of brain 
imaging devices, neuroscientists and philosophers of mind started to 
discuss which material neural processes support conscious experience, the 
so-called Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC). According to David 
Chalmers: “An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational 
system N such that representation of a content in N is sufficient, under 
conditions C, for representation of that content in consciousness”12.
10. ROCHA, Glauber. O século 
do cinema. São Paulo: Cosac 
& Naify, 2006.
11. FLUSSER, Vilem. Towards 
a philosophy of photography. 
London: Reaktion Books, 
2000.
12.  CHALMERS, David, 200 
apud NOE, Alva; THOMPSON, 
Evan. Op. cit. p. 7.
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NCC should account for the neural substrate of what is to be the 
neural activity able to respond for this or that specific subjective state – 
in such a way that, if we could provoke, in one’s brain, the very same 
neuronal activity which took place while she or he was in the movies, she 
or he would have the very same experience as if she or he was there. There 
are many problems here: to start with, the experience could not be the 
same, precisely because it was not the same: to replicate a mind state is 
not the same as to experience a circumstance – just like Merleau-Ponty 
said in the epigraph of the previous section. In a long article, Alva Noe 
and Evan Thompson demolish the possibility of orthodox NCC, through 
several different arguments, adopting the embodied mind view that the 
awareness of being situated in a circumstance is based on presences, 
not representations. However, they concede that, if there would be 
no relation between mind states and brain states, then there would 
also be nothing to look for, in terms of explaining how brain activity 
relates to conscious experiences. Thus, there must be some kind of 
isomorphism:
The isomorphism constraint demands that there must be a one-one mapping, 
at some level of description, between features of experience and features of 
the minimal neural substrate (…).
The isomorphism constraint is best understood as a criterion of explanatory 
adequacy. The thought is that if there is to be an explanatory link between 
the minimal neural substrate and the perceptual experience, then there 
must be some way to establish a relation of sameness of structure (at some 
appropriate level of description) between elements of the substrate and 
elements of the experience. To suppose that there was no isomorphism in 
this sense would make it an utter mystery how N could give rise to E (or how 
the pattern of activity at N could be E, according to one view).13
Let us name this “structural isomorphism”, so that there would 
be a necessary relation between the structure of the experience and 
the structure of brain activity; and also, the structure of the media 
apparatus to which a particular individual is coupled. Thus, if the 
medium is the message, then, at some level of description, there should 
be a triplex isomorphism between medium, experience and its neural 
basis [<brain><apparatus><experience> (individual or collective)]. The 
concept of “structure” satisfies here a fundamental question, which is 
the Gestalt imperative: experiences are experienced as a meaningful 
13. NOE, Alva; THOMPSON, 
Evan. Op. cit. p. 5.
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whole, which cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts – thus, any 
kind of possible isomorphism between experience and brain activity 
must take in to account that a point-to-point correspondence between 
brain and experience makes no sense. Since in the picture here framed 
the medium device is the least plastic of the three terms [<brain><ap
paratus><experience>], one should suppose that the transformations 
in the very plastic terms “individual experience” and, specially, “neural 
activity”, should be verifiable: we would have accomplished a scientific, 
falsifiable, demonstration of McLuhan’s thesis. 
That our daily involvements with all sort of digital devices may be 
affecting our brain connections in one way or another is an idea that is out 
there – especially among those who believe that the neural, internalist, 
explanation may account for most questions concerning human subjectivity. 
Authors such as Susan Greenfield14 and Nicholas Carr15, for example, have 
been addressing this. What is attempted here is to organize the problem 
in possible new terms, by relating [<b><a><e>] on a structural level (and 
at some level of description), thus relating specific media to specific brain 
operations that support specific modes of experience. Also, it is important 
to consider that, even if interfaces have evolved in the last decades, as a 
result of the growing research on interface design and ergonomics, if one 
considers that digital devices are still, essentially, Turing Machines with 
von Neumann architecture, one must accept that, on a structural level, 
these devices have caused much deeper changes in us than the devices 
themselves have changed. One must be quite naive not to recognize this 
when looking to the world around. Especially if assuming  a mcluhanistic 
interpretation of our society. 
Coupling
The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who notices a quality, 
nor an inert milieu that would be affected or modified by it; 
the subject of sensation is a power that is born together with 
 a certain existential milieu or that is synchronized with it.16
Man-Machine Coupling (MMC)
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela17 name “coupling” the 
process of adaptation of a particular organism to a particular ecological 
environment. The choice of this term implies a systemic view of both 
14. GREENFIELD, Susan: 
Mind change: how digital 
technologies are leaving their 
mark on our brains. New York: 
Random House, 2015.
15. CARR, Nicholas: The 
Shallows: how the internet 
is changing the way we think, 
read and remember. London: 
UK Books, 2011.
16. MERLEAU-PONTY, 2013, 
p. 219.
17. MATURANA, Humberto; 
VARELA, Francisco. 
Autopoiesis and cognition: 
the realization of the living. 
Boston: D. Reidel, 1980.
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organism and environment, according to which the trajectories of both 
systems intercross each other in such a way that they co-modulate and 
depend on the other in several ways. I shall adopt this definition to 
describe the specific interactions experienced by an individual while 
engaged with different media devices. Nowadays, coupling occurs 
intensely with digital devices of various kinds. Most times, these devices 
are coupled to other devices to which other individuals are coupled: we 
live in, and make happen, a networked society. 
Considering the coupling between individuals and devices in 
a specific media-ecology circumstance, Man-Machine-Couplings 
(MMCs) can be described on three different levels:
1. Man and Machine are understood as two distinct unities, 
which do not contaminate each other: rather, Man uses 
Machine for his own purposes;
2. Man and Machine are perceived as a unique composed 
whole, defining a new, complex unity, endowed with certain 
characteristic behaviors;
3. Man and Machine are understood as a composed whole, 
itself coupled to a particular ecological circumstance which 
surpasses their limit as a complex unity.
Each of these levels of description induces a different 
interpretation of the question of experience and demands different 
conceptual tools, if we intend to find some level of isomorphism 
between [<b><a><e>].
In the first case, Man and Machine maintain their autonomy and 
their identity, although the latter is the coupling’s least plastic element. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the synchronization of the 
individual to the demands of the apparatus determines an individual 
brain-state, and thus an experience, that is structurally isomorphic, at 
some level of description, to the structure of the apparatus;
The second case, however, must be conceptualized differently: we 
do not have two entities which, while coupled, maintain their identities. 
The coupling transforms both into a new unity, a new whole, in the 
same way that lighting a cigarette turns an “individual” into a “smoker”; 
or playing a piano turns him or her into a “pianist”. In the case of 
our daily couplings with digital devices, we are all turned into a new 
kind of hybrid entity, a cyborg. We must then resort to new conceptual 
tools. For example, Michael Polanyi18, when discussing the structure 
of consciousness, states that “the mind is the meaning of the body”. If 
18. POLANYI, Michael. The 
structure of consciousness. 
In: GREENE, Marjorie (ed.). 
Knowing and being. London: 
Routledge, 1969. p. 211-224.
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we consider MMC to be a new body – a cyborg entity – then we can 
no longer speak of a simple  isomorphic transference of the machine’s 
structure to the structure of brain-states, but rather suppose that 
individual and machine co-modulate each other. Again, however, the 
mechanical part of this new unity is its least plastic aspect and imposes 
some of its conditions to the organic part of the unity, thus resulting in 
new cognitive structures. This is what the concept of “expanded mind”, 
proposed initially by David Chalmers and Andy Clark19, and explored in 
more detail by the latter, is about: a man with a pencil and a piece of 
paper constitutes an entirely different cognitive entity than a man with 
a computer connected to the internet.
Finally, the third description expands the problem and includes its 
belonging to socio-cultural hermeneutical conditions, situating Polanyi’s 
claim in the context of a networked society where “consciousness” and 
“brain states” are the result of complex dynamical synchronizations 
which cannot be thought of as anything but emergent states of a collective 
hybrid body. According to this description, all we would be able to look 
for in individual and/or collective brain-states are synchronization 
patterns that are somehow isomorphic between themselves and to 
dynamic on-going collective processes. But even in such a complex 
description, the least plastic element is still the media-device’s structure, 
which would be supposed to modulate similar structures in individuals 
involved in the network. To be able to model this, we would not only 
need different conceptual tools, conceiving collective coupling as a 
dynamic complex system – for example, Rupert Sheldrake’s controversial 
‘Morphic Ressonance’ theory20 –, but a different description of brain 
processes and consciousness: one able to model and interpret brain 
states in dynamic terms, and able to take in consideration a specific 
culture as an important factor in the understanding of conscious and, 
now, intersubjective processes. Such a theory could be, for example, 
Gyorgy Buszaki’s theory21, in which brain processes are described as a 
carnival of rhythms modulating and coupling to each other in a media 
ecology that takes place in a noisy environment.
Concerning the experience of art
Art and science do not necessarily pursue the same goals. Both, 
however, are accepted as forms of knowledge. In a remarkable article, 
Michael Wheeler22 brings together, in a single cognitivist account, many 
of the topics addressed in the present text. By discussing the cognitive 
impact of works of art, namely Mark Rothko’s paintings, Wheeler describes 
19. CHALMERS, David; 
CLARK, Andy. The extended 
mind. Analysis, Oxford, v. 58, 
n. 1, p. 7-19, 1998.
20. SHELDRAKE, Rupert. 
A new science of life: the 
hypothesis of formative 
causation. London: Icon, 2009.
21. BUZSAKI, Gyorgy. Rhythms 
of the brain. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011.
22. WHEELER, Michael. 
From robots to Rothko: the 
bringing forth of worlds. In: 
BODEN, Margareth (ed.). The 
philosophy of artificial life. 
Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. p. 209-236.
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the coupling between spectators and artworks, individual experiences 
through which worlds are “brought forth”, placing such spectatorship on 
the limits of a certain socio-cultural context, which circumscribes specific 
hermeneutical pre-structures of knowledge. In a further step, Wheeler 
also suggests that only a dynamic systems approach can cope with the 
complexities of such situation, in which the possibilities of making sense 
of the experience seem to be restricted both by the spectator’s pertaining 
to such hermeneutical context and by the hermeneutical conditions to 
which the observer of this scene [who describes all this] belongs. As 
noticed much earlier by Walter Benjamin, technological changes, which 
emerge from and embody these gnosiologic structures, have a powerful 
impact on their social disruption.
What Wheeler does not address, in terms of the discussion raised 
here, is how these questions may be thought of in contemporary digital 
culture, with its ubiquitous placing of digital Turing-machine derived 
apparatuses modulating our daily encounters with objects and other 
people. In line with the arguments postulated here, understanding the 
experience of works of art, in the context of digital culture, demands 
considering the overall condition of the experience brought forth in our 
encounters with technological works of art, which happen in the midst 
of a full-digital culture: a media ecology in which networked cyborgs 
enact an intersubjective reality in concert with the pervasive presence of 
sensors, interfaces, zillions of data, non-organic agents and AI systems 
trained by rapidly improving technologies of machine learning.
As argued above, the experience of cinema spectatorship 
summarizes, expresses, implements the values of Modernity, bringing 
forth, on the individual and collective levels (given its reach), a subjective 
experience which is coherent with modern values, in such a way that 
the Modern ordinary man has easily recognized himself there. In his 
insightful Histoire(s) du Cinema, Jean-Luc Godard23 states: “The cinema 
gives us a world according to our desires”. It is the mirror of zeitgeist.
The effects of digital networks, devices, interfaces and apparatuses 
are no different. McLuhan24 names “Narcissus Narcosis” the effect by 
which media, by extending ourselves, immerses us into a narcissistic 
trance, a system closed to the surrounding reality. Looking at the world 
around us, with people frantically coupled to smartphones, it is fair to 
consider the comprehensiveness of such conceptualization. Although 
definitions and functions of art are highly debatable, following once again 
McLuhan, artworks should provide “anti-environment” experiences, able 
to make us aware of the conditions we are immersed in. Thus, it can be 
suggested that the challenge of artworks in such anesthetized societies 
23. Histoire(s) du Cinema – 
1A: toutes les histoires (1998), 
Jean-Luc Godard, França.
24. McLUHAN, MarshalL: 
Understanding media: the 
extensions of man. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1991.
88
Sérgio Roclaw Basbaum
Scientificizing McLuhan: 
predicates of man-machine 
coupling, the triplex 
isomorphism hypothesis, and 
its aesthetic consequences
is, by exploring the same technologies we are coupled to, and disputing 
prevalence in the same technoaesthetic regime we are immersed in 
(Basbaum25,26), to provide meaningful displacement experiences.
Can this kind of awareness be measured in  the terms discussed 
above, as to make a case in hard-science terms? It is quite common to 
hear people say that “this work of art has changed my life”. Although 
such no-return experiences certainly involve a plethora of other 
prerogatives which contribute for life-changing encounters, it is still 
up to neuroscience to show that existential, psychological impacts 
have such a measurable material counterpart. And yet, while all these 
varieties of human experience take place in a full-digital culture, 
there is still one and only common denominator in all human and 
non-human interactions in contemporary societies, which also lies 
behind all artworks that involve digital technology, and informs, on 
different levels and with different intensities, the daily experiences 
of every individual: Turing machine imperatives. For artists, this is 
the well-debated question of the flusserian black-box; for spectators, 
participants or interactors, performative agents of art experiences, this 
implies an immediate familiarity with the pre-structures of cognition, 
in many cases giving rise to a quasi-neutral art experience, in which no 
real displacement or anti-environment situation can take place. That is: 
in these cases, artists seem to be as immersed in a perceptual regime as 
any ordinary citizen, creating technological works with the same passive 
posture towards the environment as everybody else: artists become just 
agents of the intersubjective agreement in which the most constraining 
force is the structure of the experience imposed by the technological 
circumstance. Breaking away from this cul-de-sac is the enormous 
challenge digital technology still imposes on contemporary artists. 
Conclusions
That our bodies, thus our brains, must be changing somehow due 
to our belonging to an era of ubiquitous computing, is something hard to 
deny. What has been attempted here was to sketch a hypothesis according to 
which it would be possible to relate, on some level of description, our bodies, 
our experience and the machines that are defining our era and our culture, a 
Digital Culture – or, in more daring terms, our already consummated full-
digital Culture. McLuhanism implies the acceptance and the exploration 
of the thesis that the medium is the message, and that a great part of this 
message can be described in terms of the impact of a certain media over our 
perceptual bias. Thus, as discussed above, there must be some structural 
25. BASBAUM, SÉRGIO. 
Technoaesthesis: the morning 
after the deluge (of technical 
images) – thoughts on 
perception, art and technology 
in our moistmedia times. 
Technoetic Arts, Bristol, v. 13, 
n. 1-2, p. 125-136, 2015.
26. Idem. Tudo isso é do 
baralho: tecnoestese e 
infocognição (da ordem e dos 
predicados dos acoplamentos 
na circunstância 
contemporânea). Texto 
Digital, Florianóplois, v. 14, 
n. 1, p. 6-25, 2018.
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relation between [<b><a><e>]. I have shown, through the example of cinema, 
that the structure of the experience the apparatus sets in motion is related 
to the epistemological context from which it emerges. Furthermore, the 
structure of the apparatus is, in this model, the least plastic term, thus deeply 
affecting the other two, which should adapt to, and, on some level, mirror 
the structure of the machine or medium. This picture becomes even more 
compelling once we recognize the level of pervasiveness and ubiquity digital 
sensors, devices and artificial intelligence systems do have in our present 
lives, creating  enormous challenges for artists to engender displacement 
experiences in relation to an environment so encompassing that they hardly 
perceive themselves outside such perceptual regime. If art encounters are 
supposed to be cognitive experiences, they will be so only on the condition 
that they can offer alternatives to this all-involving environment.
Most of all, the fact that we are so deeply coupled with our 
devices up to the point that we have become cyborgs that cannot be 
severed or distinguished from their devices as separate entities creates 
new theoretical difficulties. The situation gets even more complex 
when we understand that we live now in a networked culture, in which 
the notion of experience can hardly be thought of in individual terms. 
There is nothing new about this: it is just the collapse of the experience 
of the classical subject in our contemporary media ecology. Thus, the 
measurability of McLuhan’s theory through NCC observation becomes 
highly undermined. And so does the nightmarish dream of controlling 
human experience through neuronal control – although our experience 
seems to be highly amenable to modulation by media control.
I expect, however, to have opened some directions based on 
which we can consider the consequences of McLuhan’s thesis, and that 
allow us to envision their “rigorous”, “empirical”, “hard-science”-like 
demonstrations in the following years. Even if, the way I see it, such 
demonstrations should not be necessary, since changes in culture and 
society clearly testify, by themselves, how right he was. 
(São Paulo – Toronto, October, 2016/June 2017 – lastly edited in 
December/2018) 
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